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FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN GROUNDWATER
REGULATION: SPORHASE v. NEBRASKA EX
REL. DOUGLAS
I. INTRODUCTION
"American water law is in a period of ferment."' As the nation's
economy has expanded, the country's demand for water has spiraled.
What once seemed a plentiful and endless resource is becoming scarce.2
Particularly in the West and Southwest, effective management of water
resources is a matter of critical importance.' In addition to the needs of
human consumption, water is essential for municipal, agricultural, and
industrial use as well as for the development of energy related re-
sources.4 The problem of maintaining an adequate water supply in
these states is much more than an important regional issue.
Since the energy shortages of the 1970's, the need for developing
domestic energy resources has become a matter of national signifi-
cance. Many of these sources of potential energy are found in the
West;5 energy development in these states is contingent upon the avail-
ability of an adequate water supply.6 The increased development of
1. F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 15 (3d ed. 1979).
2. See 1 U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 1975-
2000, SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT (1978); Sheets, Water, Will We Have Enough to Go
Around?, U.S. News & World Rep., June 29, 1981, at 34. But see COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
WATER SUPPLY SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO MEETING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GOALS 47-
50 (Jan. 24, 1980) (report to Congress) (concluding that the energy industry's "thirst for water"
will not necessarily create shortages throughout the West).
3. As one notewriter has observed: "The distribution of water, its geographical and tempo-
ral variability, is the overriding influence that shapes the West. Just as it is impossible to dismiss
the role of water in the historical development of the region, it is foolhardy to ignore its limited
availability as a constraint on future growth." Note, Bubb v. Christensen: The Rights ofthe Private
Landowner Yield to the Rights of the Water Appropriator Under the Colorado Doctrine, 58 DEN.
L.J. 825, 825 (1981).
4. Hostyk, "i4o Controls the Water? The Emerging Balance Among Federal, State, and In-
dian Jurisdictional Claims and Its Impact on Energy Development in the Upper Colorado and Upper
Missouri River Basins, 18 TULSA L.J. 1, 76 (1982).
5. Id. at 3.
6. Recent Development, Interstate Transfers of Water: South Dakota's Decision to Market
Waterfor Coal Slurry Operations, 18 TULSA L.J. 515, 515 & n.l (1983). One commentator charac-
terizes the importance of water as follows:
Today a second war between the states is raging-this time over the control and ex-
ploitation of the nation's natural resources. At the frontlines of this natural resources
conflict is water-water to develop new energy sources such as coal and oil shale; water
to transport these new energy sources in interstate slurry lines, water to generate electric-
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these natural resources, however, has seriously depleted the region's
limited water supply.7 Therefore, many cities and states requiring an
additional water supply seek to import water from areas of surplus.'
As a result, several states,
fearing that demands from outside their borders will prevent
them from ensuring adequate supplies of water for their own
citizens, have passed legislation to prohibit or limit interstate
transfers of groundwater. At present, 14 states plus the Dis-
trict of Columbia have adopted such legislation. Not surpris-
ingly, as the competition for limited supplies becomes more
intense, some of these statutes have been attacked as unconsti-
tutional burdens of interstate commerce.9
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of the
Nebraska water embargo statute in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Doug-
las.'° Although the expressed purpose of the Nebraska groundwater
ity; water to meet the demands of the industries and people migrating to the arid Sun-
belt; and water to irrigate the expansive farming operations of the Southwest. The
increase in water consumption throughout the United States has led to both local and
regional shortages.
Note, Interstate Transfer of Water. The Western Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 1249, 1249 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
7. Recent Development, supra note 6, at 515-16 ("[I]ncreased demand for western water
from higher consumptive uses in agriculture, industry, and energy production has outstripped
local surface and groundwater supplies, causing shortages." (footnote omitted)); see also Clyde,
State Prohibitions on the Interstate Exportation of Scarce Water Resources, 53 U. COLo. L. REv.
529, 529 (1982) (In the 1970's, there was "a tremendous population shift to the West and South-
west ... [which,] coupled with increased industrialization and development of energy resources,
created heavy demands upon the region's limited water resources.").
8. Commerce Clause Limits States' Ability to Stop Groundwater Exports- Supreme Court
Overturns Nebraska Reciprocity Rule, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,083. 10,083 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Limits]; see City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 831-32
(W.D. Tex.) (growing city in southern Oklahoma acquired water rights to Texas groundwater and
imported this water to Oklahoma), a~f'dper cur/am, 385 U.S. 35 (1966); Recent Development,
supra note 6 (discussing South Dakota's decision to sell water for use in the proposed Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI) interstate coal slurry pipeline).
9. See Commerce Clause Limits, supra note 8, at 10,083 (footnote omitted).
The competition for water has been fiercest in the Western States, where high con-
sumptive uses in agriculture, industry, and energy production have increased the de-
mand for water beyond the capacity of limited surface and ground water supplies. The
Western States have reacted to the rapid exploitation of their diminishing water supplies
by enacting various prohibitions on the exportation of water for interstate uses. These
water embargo statutes prohibit, or at least severely restrict, the exportation of water to
neighboring states. The statutes constitute the Western States' primary defense in their
attempts to exclude nonresidents from using their water supplies.
Note, supra note 6, at 1249-50 (footnotes omitted).
Oklahoma is one such state that has enacted a water embargo statute which generally prohib-
its diverting Oklahoma water to neighboring states. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1085.22 (1981). For a
compendium of those states with water embargo statutes, see Recent Development, supra note 6,
at 523 n.41.
10. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
2
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statute was to promote the state's welfare,II the Court found that the
Nebraska Legislature accomplished this purpose in a manner that vio-
lated the commerce clause. The Court held that groundwater is an arti-
cle of commerce and thus subject to judicial restraints on state control
and potential affirmative federal regulation.' 2
As a result, the Sporhase decision has sparked a great amount of
interest in the constitutional propriety of water embargo statutes and
has generated numerous questions concerning how and to what extent
a state may control its groundwater. This Recent Development ana-
lyzes the Sporhase decision and discusses its impact on western ground-
water law.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sporhase owned contiguous tracts of land in Nebraska and Colo-
rado. A well located on the Nebraska tract pumped groundwater to
irrigate crops on both tracts. 3 A Nebraska statute' 4 required the per-
11. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). One commentator writes that "the ostensible
purpose of all these statutes is to preserve the state's limited water resources, necessary for the
health and prosperity of their [sic] citizens, and to promote the general welfare." Clyde, supra
note 7, at 530 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (1973 & Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-115
(1977)).
12. 102 S. Ct. at 3463, 3466.
13. Id. at 3458.
14. The Nebraska groundwater regulation provides:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other entity intending to
withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska and trans-
port it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the Department of Water Resources
[DWR] for a permit to do so. If the Director of Water Resources finds that the with-
drawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation
and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall
grant the permit if the state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to
withdraw and transport ground water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978) (emphasis added).
There are three distinct types of embargo regulations. The first type completely prohibits any
exportation of water from the state. The second type permits interstate transportation of water on
a discretionary basis with prior legislative approval. The third type allows interstate water trans-
fers only on a reciprocal basis. Note, supra note 6, at 1251-53 (categorizing each of the various
states according to its specific statutory scheme).
Professor Aiken explains the Nebraska law as follows:
A DWR permit is required before ground water withdrawn in Nebraska can be used in
another state. The permit may be granted if the ground water withdrawal is reasonable.
A withdrawal is reasonable if it is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground
water, is not detrimental to the public welfare, and the state into which the ground water
is to be transferred grants reciprocal rights to transport into and use ground water in
Nebraska. Failure to obtain a permit is a class IV misdemeanor. Ground water with-
drawals can be enjoined until the DWR permit has been obtained. Wells in violation of
this permit requirement are illegal wells, the construction or use of which may be
stopped by a natural resources district.
Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law andAdministration, 59 NEB. L. REv. 917, 983 (1980). Thus,
3
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mission of the Director of Water Resources before groundwater could
be transferred across state lines. Sporhase never obtained the required
permission 5 and thus Nebraska sued to enjoin Sporhase from trans-
porting its groundwater into Colorado. 6 In issuing the injunction, the
trial court rejected the argument that the statute placed an impermissi-
ble burden on interstate commerce.' 7 The Nebraska Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court and found that, under Nebraska law,
groundwater is not an article of commerce; thus the Nebraska regula-
tion did not violate the commerce clause.' 8
In reversing the Nebraska decision,' 9 the United States Supreme
Court specifically addressed the following three issues:
1) Whether groundwater is an article of interstate
commerce;
2) whether the Nebraska regulatory scheme imposes imper-
missible burdens on interstate commerce; and
3) whether Congress has authorized the states to regulate
groundwater in a manner that otherwise would be
forbidden. 0
The Court concluded that groundwater is an article of interstate com-
merce and that portions of the Nebraska statute violated the commerce
clause.21
the Nebraska law denies out-of-state water appropriations to those states that deny appropriations
for import into Nebraska. Contra Note, supra note 6, at 1252 & n. 19 (classifies Nebraska statute
as discretionary embargo regulation).
15. 102 S. Ct. at 3458. Sporhase never applied for the required permit. Since Colorado law
prohibits interstate water transfer and has no reciprocity provision, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-
136 (Supp. 1982), it is certain that Nebraska would not have issued the permit. Because of the
impossibility of obtaining a permit, the Court concluded that the failure to submit an application
did not deprive Sporhase of standing to challenge the legality of the reciprocity requirement. 102
S. Ct. at 3458 n.2.
Conversely, the permit could have issued if Sporhase had owned contiguous tracts of land in
Nebraska and Kansas, since a Kansas statute allowed reciprocal use of water in Nebraska. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-726 (1977).
16. 102 S. Ct. at 3458.
17. Id. The commerce clause provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power. . .To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
18. 102 S. Ct. at 3458. The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Douglas v.
Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614'(1981), is the subject of Note, State ex rel. Douglas v.
Sporhase: Public Ownership of Ground Water, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 263 (1981).
19. 102 S. Ct. at 3467.
20. Id. at 3457-58.
21. Id. at 3463, 3465. The Court found that the reciprocity requirement of NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 46-613.01 (1978) violated the commerce clause and left to the Nebraska state courts the question
of "whether the invalid portion is severable." 102 S. Ct. at 3467.
Prior to the Sporhase decision, some Nebraska commentators speculated that the Nebraska
groundwater embargo statute was unconstitutional. Eg., Aiken, supra note 14, at 988 ("Federal
4
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Groundwater22 as an Article of Interstate Commerce
Nebraska contended that groundwater is not an article of com-
merce under the "public ownership of natural resources theory." 23 The
state, therefore, could regulate its groundwater and prohibit interstate
transfers without commerce clause interference. The Supreme Court,
however, had previously addressed and rejected the public ownership
theory in Hughes v. Oklahoma4
In Hughes, the Court considered the validity of an Oklahoma stat-
ute prohibiting the interstate transport of minnows caught in the state.
Oklahoma argued that the ban was constitutional because the state also
prohibited both private ownership and intrastate commerce in the re-
source.25 The Court rejected this argument and concluded that the
mere regulation of the resource necessarily involved interstate com-
merce. Accordingly, the statute was struck down.26
Sporhase adopted the Hughes reasoning in rejecting the public
ownership of resources theory.27 While the Court conceded that the
states have a legitimate interest in water conservation, it expressly
found that the states' interests in water regulation "clearly have an in-
terstate dimension." 8 The Court noted:
[O]ver 80% of our water supplies is used for agricultural pur-
court decisions suggest that state prohibition of interstate groundwater transfers is an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce if intrastate groundwater transfers are authorized."); Note,
supra note 18, at 271.
22. For background information on groundwater, see Aiken, supra note 14; Clark & Clyde,
Western Ground- Water Law, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 440-446 (R. Clark ed. 1972 &
Supp. 1978); Jensen, The411ocation of Percolating Water Under the Oklahoma Ground Water Law
of 1972, 14 TULSA L.J. 437 (1979); Kyl, The 1980.4rizona Groundwater Management Act: From
Inception to Current Constitutional Challenge, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 471 (1982).
23. 102 S. Ct. at 3458-62. States often assert a public ownership interest in natural resources
as a justification for prohibitive and restrictive statutes. Note, supra note 6, at 1259. It was once
believed that public ownership prevented natural resources, such as groundwater, from being arti-
cles of commerce and thus exempted prohibitive and restrictive statutes from commerce clause
sanctions. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding Connecticut statute prohibit-
,ing export of game birds).
24. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
25. Id. at 325.
26. Id. at 338.
27. 102 S. Ct. at 3461.
In expressly overruling Geer three years ago, this Court traced the demise of the public
ownership theory And definitively recast it as "but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand
of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource."
I d (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334).
28. 102 S. Ct. at 3462.
5
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poses. The agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms
are worldwide. They provide the archtypical example of
commerce among the several States for which the Framers of
our Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation.
The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer-underlying
appellants' tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well
as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas-con-
firms. . . a significant federal interest in conservation as well
as in fair allocation of this diminishing resource.29
Having emphasized the interstate dimensions, the Court thus found
that groundwater is an article of interstate commerce.30
B. Nebraska Regulatory Scheme Impermissibly Burdens Interstate
Commerce 3 1
Prior to Sporhase, the only federal decision questioning the consti-
tutionality of a state water embargo statute was City ofA//us v. Carr. 32
Altus, Oklahoma, attempted to augment its inadequate water supply by
obtaining groundwater from Texas lands owned by Altus residents.
Texas thereafter enacted a statute prohibiting the transportation of
groundwater without prior approval of the state legislature.33 The city
sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute. A three judge federal district
court struck down the statute as an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.
34
When a state exhibits a legitimate state interest, the Court balances
the competing federal and state interests to determine if the state inter-
est can be achieved by other means less restrictive on interstate com-
merce.35  Using this balancing analysis, the Court noted that
29. Id. at 3462-63 (citations omitted).
30. Id. A fair reading of the Sporhase opinion indicates that this threshold issue had to be
resolved before a commerce clause infringement analysis could be made. See Commerce Clause
Limits, supra note 8, at 10,085.
31. "[T~he Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's ability to prefer its own citizens in the
utilization of natural resources found within its borders." Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533
(1978) (Alaska statute requiring employers to prefer residents in all employment resulting from oil
and gas transactions to which the state was a party invalidated as discriminatory).
32. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.) (three judge federal district court struck down Texas em-
bargo statute), afdper curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966). City ofAitur is discussed in Note, supra note 6,
at 1257-58.
33. 255 F. Supp. at 832.
34. Id. at 840.
35. This balancing test was established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.. 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
where it was applied to a statute requiring all growers to pack cantaloupes in Arizona in contain-
ers approved by state supervisors.
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
[Vol. 18:713
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Nebraska's purpose in conservation and preservation of groundwater
requires special deference for four reasons. First, in the absence of fed-
eral regulation, by negative implication the Constitution grants Ne-
braska the right to regulate its water resources.36 Second, Nebraska's
power to regulate water is a vital and legitimate exercise of its police
power.37 Third, Nebraska's claim of ownership, while not removing
the water from commerce,38 does justify a preference for its citizens to
use the water.39 Fourth, prior state conservation efforts give Nebraska
groundwater attributes of a public rather than a private good.4 ° With
the scales weighted heavily by these considerations, the Court con-
cluded that the first three provisions of the Nebraska statute41 did not
impermissibly burden interstate commerce.42
Even though the Court believed these first three provisions were
not facially invalid, it found that the reciprocity provision of the Ne-
braska statute unduly interfered with interstate commerce and posed a
definite barrier to commerce between Nebraska and neighboring
states.43 Thus the Court invalidated the reciprocity provision before
even reaching the balancing stage. The burden placed on interstate
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
.d. at 142.
As a general rule, any state legislation that interferes or unreasonably burdens interstate com-
merce is constitutionally invalid. For a discussion of limits on state power imposed by federalism,
see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 262-64 (1978 &
Supp. 1982); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-I to -12 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
36. 102 S. Ct. at 3464. For a general discussion of negative implications of the commerce
clause, see F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
51-52, 97-98 (2d ed. 1964); L. TRIBE, supra note 35, §§ 6-2 to -14 (discussing constitutional limita-
tions upon state interference with interstate commerce); Sholley, The Negative Implications of the
Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936).
37. 102 S. Ct. at 3464.
38. Id. at 3462.
39. Id. at 3464. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist accepted the defense that a
state's claim of public ownership would give the state greater authority to regulate natural re-
sources which are essential to the well being and lives of its citizens. Since Nebraska recognizes
only a limited right in the landowner to use groundwater, Justice Rehnquist believes that ground-
water cannot be "commerce" as far as Nebraska is concerned and the limitation on the Nebraska
landowner to use water on land he owns in an adjoining state does not run "afoul of Congress'
unexercised authority to regulate interstate commerce." Id. at 3469 (Relnquist, J., dissenting).
40. 102 S. Ct. at 3464-65.
41. The withdrawal of the groundwater must be 1) reasonable, 2) not contrary to the conser-
vation and use of groundwater, and 3) not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 3465.
43. Id.
7
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commerce by the provision was more than incidental. This defect
alone would not invalidate the provision, but such a provision requires
a close means-end relationship." Applying a strict scrutiny standard of
review,45 the Court found no evidence that this provision closely fit the
conservation and preservation purposes asserted. 6
After invalidating the reciprocity provision, the Court detailed a
situation in which a state might legitimately prohibit the export of its
water. The Sporhase Court indicated that if a state prohibits or se-
verely restricts the interstate transportation of water, that prohibition or
restriction is valid only if the state has a shortage of water47 and its
purpose is to promote the health and welfare of its citizens-not the
health of its economy. 8
C. Water Embargo Statutes Not Authorized by Congress
Justice Stevens' opinion rejected Nebraska's argument that Con-
gress has authorized impermissible burdens on commerce in ground-
water by its deference to state water laws.49 The thrust of the opinion
44: L. TRIBE, supra note 35, § 6-5, at 326 (1978) (State regulation affecting interstate com-
merce will be upheld if (a) the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end and (b) the
regulatory burden imposed on interstate commerce, and any discrimination against it, are out-
weighed by the state interest in enforcing the regulation.).
45. [T]he idea of strict scrutiny acknowledges that . . . [some legislative] choices...
must be subjected to close analysis. . . . [It may also be understood as admonishing
lawmakers and regulators . . . to be particularly cautious of their own purposes and
premises and of the effect of their choices.
When expressed as a standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is, in Professor
Gunther's formulation, "strict" in theory and usually "fatal" in fact.
Id. § 16-6, at 1000 (emphasis in original) (citing Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Fore-
word- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972)).
46. 102 S. Ct. at 3465. The Court addressed the same issue in City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.
Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), afdper curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966):
Moreover. . .[the Texas statute] does not have for its purpose, nor does it operate to
conserve water resources of the State of Texas except in the sense that it does so for her
own benefit to the detriment of her sister States as in the case of West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co. In the name of conservation, the statute seeks to prohibit interstate shipments
of water while indulging in the substantial discrimination of permitting the unrestricted
intrastate production and transportation of water between points within the State ....
Obviously, the statute had little relation to the cause of conservation.
Id. at 839-40; see also West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (invalidated
Oklahoma statute denying right of eminent domain and right to use state highways to transport
natural gas outside state).
47. 102 S. Ct. at 3465.
48. Id. at 3464. Actual conservation is a legitimate and necessary state purpose, but hoarding
natural resources, including water, is an unacceptable practice which the commerce clause does
not permit. See Note,supra note 6,'at 1275;seealso H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525, 538 (1949) (state may not use its admitted powers to protect the health and safety of its people
as a basis for suppressing competition).
49. 102 S. Ct. at 3465. Nebraska's argument was "based on 37 statutes in which Congress has
8
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was that Congress cannot maintain a "hands ofi' policy in all instances
of water regulation by the states. The Court stated:
Although the 37 statutes and interstate compacts demonstrate
Congress' deferences to state water law, they do not indicate
that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional con-
straints on such state laws . . . . Neither the fact that Con-
gress has chosen not to create a federal water law to govern
water rights involved in federal projects, nor the fact that
Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differ-
ences over water rights through mutual agreements, consti-
tutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the
unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on
commerce.50
"Expressly stated" consent by Congress will remove state legislation
from attack under the commerce clause,51 but no such permission was
given to Nebraska.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Sporhase, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that groundwater is beyond the reach of the commerce clause
because it is a publicly owned resource. The Court found that the Ne-
braska reciprocity provision was not the least restrictive method of pro-
tecting the state's legitimate conservation interests. Thus, the
reciprocity provision was voided under a strict commerce clause analy-
sis. It therefore follows that if the reciprocity statutes place an imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce, then the discretionary and
totally prohibitive statutes5 2 must certainly violate the commerce
clause. 3
Nevertheless, the Sporhase Court recognized a state's vital interest
in effectively managing its own groundwater resources. The Court
deferred to state water law, and on a number of interstate compacts dealing with water that have
been approved by Congress." Id.
50. Id. at 3466 (citations omitted). It has been argued that the dictum regarding the extent to
which Congress' regulatory power extends to groundwater was an "unnecessary detour." Com-
merce Clause Limits, supra note 8, at 10,087. "[Tlhe dictum stands out as a clear message to
Congress, almost an invitation, that it will find the constitutional road clear should it decide to
address the problem of groundwater conservation and management." Id.
51. Id.
52. For an explanation of the three types of water embargo statutes, see supra note 14.
53. See Note, supra note 6, at 1253-75; Comment, Do State Water Anti-Exportation Statutes
Violate the Commerce Clause? or Will New Mexico's Embargo Law Hold Water?, 21 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 617 (1981) (discussing City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 730 M (D.N.M. filed Sept.
5, 1980) and its challenge to the constitutionality of New Mexico's embargo statute).
1983]
9
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even explained that the demonstration of a legitimate state interest in
conserving dwindling groundwater resources can preserve a ban on in-
terstate transfers. Therefore, state legislatures will need to reevaluate
the purpose of their laws, and perhaps restrict their own citizens' use of
groundwater, in order to comply with the constitutional requirements
established by Sporhase.
It is not yet clear what impact, if any, Sporhase will have on state
regulation of surface water.5 4 Moreover, the decision may be disrup-
tive to groundwater regulation only in the short run. The Court's rec-
ognition of the continuing public interest in groundwater should be
sufficient to enjoin the transfer until a state legislature has an opportu-
nity to enact a nondiscriminatory statute." Whether these western
states can continue to prohibit exports of groundwater in the long run,
however, remains to be seen.
JS. Garrett
54. While Sporhase stands for only a limited intrusion of the Commerce Clause into the
sacrosanct state domain of water resource management, it may have more serious short-
term impacts on state law. Ever since the Court's decision to take jurisdiction over
Sporhase, state water resource managers have feared that a decision against Nebraska
would have an extremely adverse impact upon states' efforts to protect their groundwater
resources and could severely disrupt regulation of surface water use as well. They sup-
posed that if the Commerce Clause precludes state efforts to regulate interstate transfers
of groundwater then logically it also would disrupt state regulation of surface water
transfers. Such a decision would reverse the judicial and congressional recognition of
states' authority over water resources. The legality of equitable apportionment decrees,
which resolve disputes between states over shared water, would be suspect.
Commerce Clause Limits, supra note 8, at 10,087.
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